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HIDDEN NONDEFENSE:  PARTISANSHIP IN 
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AMICUS BRIEFS 
AND THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY 
Lisa F. Grumet* 
INTRODUCTION 
In all fifty states, the State Attorney General (SAG)—as the state’s chief 
legal officer—is charged with defending state laws that are challenged in 
court.1  If an SAG declines to defend or challenges a state law on the ground 
that it is unconstitutional—an action scholars describe as “nondefense”2—
the SAG ordinarily will disclose this decision to the public.3 
This Essay discusses a hidden form of nondefense that can occur when 
SAGs file amicus curiae briefs on behalf of their states in matters before the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  Surprisingly, some SAGs have joined multistate 
amicus briefs that support invalidating other states’ laws without disclosing 
that similar state or local laws exist in the SAGs’ own jurisdictions.  This 
Essay explores this problem through analysis of multistate amicus briefs filed 
in the 2017 Supreme Court term.  It proposes requiring that SAGs disclose 
relevant laws from their state when they file amicus briefs on behalf of their 
state with the Supreme Court. 
Any SAG may file an amicus brief “on behalf of [their] State” without 
obtaining leave from the Court.4  Like other amicus participants, SAGs must 
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 1. Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 
233 (2014). 
 2. See id. at 219 (explaining that scholars define “nondefense” to include “both decisions 
not to defend the constitutionality of statutes that have been challenged in court and decisions 
to affirmatively attack statutes”). 
 3. See id. at 271. 
 4. SUP. CT. R. 37(4). 
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include in their amicus briefs a statement of “the interest of the amicus 
curiae.”5  But when SAGs sign onto amicus briefs, unlike when the state is 
a party to litigation, the Court does not expressly require them to identify 
laws of their own state that might be impacted by the outcome of the 
litigation.6  In multistate amicus briefs, SAGs typically allege common 
interests among the participating states.7  While a multistate amicus brief 
may discuss individual state laws, this discussion is not required and is not 
always included. 
In this time of significant political polarization, it is particularly troubling 
that SAGs can join partisan multistate amicus briefs that undermine their own 
state laws without disclosing this information in the brief.8  This practice can 
distort principles of separation of powers within a state and transform the 
SAG’s role without accountability to the SAG’s constituents.  That is, an 
SAG may pursue policy or political goals through Supreme Court litigation 
that could not be accomplished through legislative changes within the SAG’s 
state, either because of a lack of political will, the unpopularity such a change 
could cause, or both. 
This practice is evident in multistate amicus briefs submitted by 
Republican SAGs in two high-profile cases in the 2017 Supreme Court term.  
In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees,9 
the Michigan and Wisconsin SAGs opposed an Illinois law, under which 
nonunion members could be required to pay public-sector union agency fees, 
without defending or even mentioning similar laws in their own states.10  In 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,11 
multiple Republican SAGs opposed Colorado’s enforcement of its law 
prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination in public accommodations 
against a bakery that denied a same-sex couple’s request for a wedding 
 
 5. Id. r. 37(5). 
 6. Id. r. 24(1)(f) (requiring “merits” briefs to include “[t]he constitutional provisions, 
treaties, statutes, ordinances, and regulations involved in the case, set out verbatim with 
appropriate citation”). 
 7. See Timothy Meyer, Federalism and Accountability:  State Attorneys General, 
Regulatory Litigation, and the New Federalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 904–06 (2007). 
 8. See PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL:  STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND 
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 196 (2015) (concluding that a “lack 
of consistency” in SAG positions on federalism and the scope of state policymaking authority 
“suggests that AGs are using their structural independence and nearly exclusive control over 
shaping their state’s position in litigation to pursue their own, and increasingly partisan, 
conceptions of good public policy”).  For a historical perspective on policymakers taking 
conflicting positions on federalism depending on the issue, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE:  A HISTORICAL 
INQUIRY 59–68, 191–93 (2007). 
 9. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 10. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae States of Michigan, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin in Support of 
Petitioner, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466) [hereinafter Republican Janus Brief]. 
 11. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
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cake.12  Many of these SAGs endorsed arguments that could have 
undermined public-accommodation antidiscrimination laws in their own 
states without disclosing those laws to the Court.13 
When an SAG joins an amicus brief that challenges another state’s law and 
they fail to disclose their home-state laws, the implicit message is that the 
SAG’s home-state laws are not implicated or at risk.  If the SAG’s state has 
laws or practices that may be adversely impacted by the litigation, the SAG 
has essentially engaged in nondefense without providing notice to the public 
or to the Court.14  Furthermore, SAGs can use the amicus brief to collaterally 
attack laws that they oppose for personal or political reasons, even if the 
SAGs might be legally required to defend the laws if challenged in their own 
states.15 
This Essay argues that SAGs should be required to disclose information 
concerning laws in their states that may be adversely impacted by the 
outcome of the litigation when they file or sign onto Supreme Court amicus 
briefs.  Part I provides context concerning the role of SAGs and nondefense 
generally.  Part II discusses the politicization of multistate amicus briefs and 
the lack of requirements for SAGs to disclose their own laws when attacking 
laws in other states.  It includes data on partisanship and disclosure in amicus 
briefs filed by SAGs on opposite sides in five high-profile cases from the 
2017 Supreme Court term.  Part III uses two case studies—the Janus and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop cases—to show how SAGs engage in nondefense in 
multistate amicus briefs without disclosing their own state laws.  Part IV 
outlines a proposal to require transparency in SAG amicus briefs filed with 
the Court to address hidden nondefense. 
I.  NONDEFENSE GENERALLY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPARENCY 
Every state has an attorney general, and forty-three of those SAGs are 
independently elected by state voters.16  The scope of an SAG’s 
responsibilities is generally a matter of state law.17  Among other duties, 
 
 12. See generally Brief for the States of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, by and Through Governor Matthew G. Bevin, and Paul R. Le Page, Governor of 
Maine, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(No. 16-111) [hereinafter Republican Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief]. 
 13. See infra Table 1. 
 14. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 219. 
 15. Cf. Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys 
General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2125–27, 2144–
50 (2015) (discussing how political considerations may lead SAGs “to take litigation positions 
that reflect their legal policy preferences and resonate with their political base”). 
 16. See About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/naag/ 
about_naag.php [https://perma.cc/JC5C-63Q7] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).  Five SAGs are 
appointed by governors (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming), one 
SAG is chosen by the state legislature (Maine), and one SAG is appointed by the state supreme 
court (Tennessee). Id. 
 17. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 15, at 2125–27. 
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SAGs represent state agencies and officials in litigation, including litigation 
challenging state laws.18 
There is some disagreement over the scope of an SAG’s duty to defend the 
state’s legislation.19  Some government officials and scholars have argued 
that SAGs should defend state laws in almost all circumstances, with very 
limited exceptions.20  Others have argued that SAGs can and should decline 
to defend state legislation that the SAG determines is unconstitutional.21  
Neal Devins and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash surveyed state statutory and 
constitutional provisions and concluded that the “duty to defend” question 
varies by state—some SAGs have a clear duty to defend, some SAGs have 
no clear obligation, and some SAGs have authority or even a duty to 
challenge state laws that the SAG determines are unconstitutional.22 
Historically, SAGs rarely decline to defend state laws, although 
nondefense appears to be increasingly common in recent years.23  
Nondefense received considerable attention in the years leading up to 
Obergefell v. Hodges.24  Before Obergefell was decided, U.S. Attorney 
General Eric Holder declined to defend the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 
and multiple SAGs declined to defend state laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage.25 
When an SAG declines to defend a statute, the SAG generally discloses 
and explains this decision.  Katherine Shaw has emphasized the importance 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. This question is related to a broader debate over the role of government attorneys to 
promote justice in civil litigation or in nonlitigation matters.  For arguments that government 
lawyers do have a justice-seeking role, see Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private 
Values:  Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. 
REV. 789, 789 (2000); Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici:  Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely 
Defend the Rights of the Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2339–40 (2013); Bruce A. Green, 
Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 279 
(2000); and Lisa F. Grumet, Promoting Justice from the Inside:  The Counseling Role of Local 
Government and School District Attorneys, in 2 IMPACT:  COLLECTED ESSAYS ON EXPANDING 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 127, 129 n.6 (2016), https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1003&context=impact_center [https://perma.cc/F5MH-54FX].  For arguments that 
the government lawyer’s role is similar to that of a private attorney, see Catherine J. Lanctot, 
The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer:  The Three 
Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 1013–17 (1991); and Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 
1294 (1987). 
 20. See, e.g., Rena M. Lindevaldsen, The Erosion of the Rule of Law when a State Attorney 
General Refuses to Defend the Constitutionality of Controversial Laws, 21 BARRY L. REV. 1, 
50–51 (2015); Gregory F. Zoeller, Duty to Defend and the Rule of Law, 90 IND. L.J. 513, 556 
(2015); see also Michael A. Cardozo, The Conflicting Ethical, Legal, and Public Policy 
Obligations of the Government’s Chief Legal Officer, 22 PROF. LAW., no. 3, 2014, at 4, 6–8. 
 21. Shaw, supra note 1, at 263–71. 
 22. Devins & Prakash, supra note 15, at 2105–06, 2127–34; see also Shaw, supra note 1, 
at 257–63 (discussing state approaches to nondefense of state laws). 
 23. Devins & Prakash, supra note 15, at 2135–40 (identifying three SAG nondefense 
cases from 1930 to 1980, twelve cases from 1980 to 2007, twenty cases from 2008 to 2014, 
and sixteen cases from 1930 to 2011 in which SAGs initiated challenges to state laws on the 
grounds that they were unconstitutional). 
 24. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 25. Devins & Prakash, supra note 15, at 2102. 
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of SAG transparency about the existence of and rationale for a nondefense 
decision.26  Transparency in the context of nondefense is important because 
it provides notice to the legislature and other government officials, engages 
the public, and permits others to seek leave to participate in litigation 
challenging the law.27  At times, other government officials (such as 
members of the legislature or the governor) may intervene or appoint counsel 
to defend the law.28 
Furthermore, if an SAG took a position in state court that conflicted with 
a state law, the SAG would likely be required to disclose this information 
under ethical rules that mandate “candor toward the tribunal.”29  Under 
Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (a model code that most 
states have adopted in some form): 
A lawyer shall not knowingly:  (1) make a false statement of fact or law to 
a tribunal or . . . ; (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the 
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the 
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel . . . .30 
Transparency can also “help guard against the erosion of the distinction 
between constitutional law and pure politics.”31  That is, requiring SAGs to 
discuss their reasons for nondefense minimizes the likelihood that SAGs 
could take positions in litigation for personal, partisan, or political reasons, 
as opposed to constitutional concerns. 
II.  PARTISANSHIP IN MULTISTATE AMICUS BRIEFS AND 
THE LACK OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
Given the importance of states in the American constitutional system, SAG 
amicus briefs can have considerable influence on the Supreme Court.32  
Scholars have observed an increase in the number of amicus briefs filed by 
states and the number of states participating in each brief.33  Most SAGs have 
created solicitor general or appellate advocacy offices, which may provide 
resources and expertise for Supreme Court amicus brief writing.34  Since 
 
 26. Shaw, supra note 1, at 271–74. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Devins & Prakash, supra note 15, at 2132. 
 29. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  See generally 
Elaine Bucklo, The Temptation Not to Disclose Adverse Authority, 40 LITIGATION, Winter 
2014, at 26. 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 31. Shaw, supra note 1, at 274. 
 32. See, e.g., Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 602–03 
(2018); Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests:  Attorneys General 
as Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1232–33 (2015); see also Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, 
Collective Action, and the Development of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 362–70 
(2012); Brandon D. Harper, Comment, The Effectiveness of State-Filed Amicus Briefs at the 
United States Supreme Court, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1503, 1515–24 (2014). 
 33. Lemos & Quinn, supra note 32, at 1238–39; see also Cornell W. Clayton & Jack 
McGuire, State Litigation Strategies and Policymaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 23–25 (2001). 
 34. Johnstone, supra note 32, at 601. 
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1982, the Center for Supreme Court Advocacy of the nonpartisan National 
Association of Attorneys General has provided training, coordination, 
editing, and other support for SAGs filing briefs with the Supreme Court.35  
In addition, the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA), founded 
in 1999, and the Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA), 
founded in 2002, provide political and organizational support for their 
members.36 
While some multistate amicus briefs are bipartisan, scholars have 
documented an increase in partisanship in recent years, with Democratic 
SAGs and Republican SAGs at times filing competing amicus briefs in high-
profile cases.37  The positions in SAG amicus briefs sometimes concern 
whether states, as a general matter, should have authority to act in a specific 
area, but in some cases they involve conflicts over substantive policy.38  Paul 
Nolette and Colin Provost determined that partisanship in SAG amicus briefs 
has significantly escalated under the administrations of Presidents Barack 
Obama and Donald Trump.39 
Margaret Lemos and Kevin Quinn have suggested that the amicus brief 
“statement of the interests” requirement40 could serve as a check on 
partisanship in amicus briefs, as SAGs whose state laws conflict with their 
political beliefs “may not be able to give full vent to their partisan 
motivations.”41  Anthony Johnstone has argued that “the Court should pay 
close attention to the states’ interests” as expressed in an amicus brief and 
should be “suspicious of arguments that serve partisan goals without any 
apparent relationship to state federalism interests.”42 
However, the “statements of the interests” in multistate amicus briefs do 
not always provide sufficient information to assess the interests of the 
participating states.  When an SAG files an individual amicus brief on behalf 
of a state, the statement of interest in the brief may discuss interests specific 
to that state.43  For example, in Janus, the California SAG filed an individual 
 
 35. NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy, NAT’L ASS’N ATTORNEYS GEN., 
http://www.naag.org/naag/about_naag/center-supreme-court.php [https://perma.cc/JT9F-
7WAM] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see Lemos & Quinn, supra note 32, at 1237. 
 36. Johnstone, supra note 32, at 609–10; DEMOCRATIC ATTORNEYS GEN. ASS’N, 
https://democraticags.org/ [https://perma.cc/2BE2-QBR9] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); 
REPUBLICAN ATTORNEYS GEN. ASS’N, https://www.republicanags.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
TJ5W-ULJ4] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 37. For detailed studies of partisanship and SAG participation before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, see Paul Nolette & Colin Provost, Change and Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys 
General in the Obama and Trump Administrations, 48 PUBLIUS 469, 473–76 (2018); and Paul 
Nolette, State Litigation During the Obama Administration:  Diverging Agendas in an Era of 
Polarized Politics, 44 PUBLIUS 451, 452 (2014); and see also Lemos & Quinn, supra note 32, 
at 1247–60. 
 38. Lemos & Quinn, supra note 32, at 1241–42, 1257–58, 1263. 
 39. Nolette & Provost, supra note 37, at 474–76. 
 40. SUP. CT. R. 37. 
 41. Lemos & Quinn, supra note 32, at 1266 (“If state law embraces restrictive abortion 
policies, for example, it would be challenging for the state AG to advance a pro-choice 
argument on behalf of the state.”). 
 42. Johnstone, supra note 32, at 620, 622; see also Solimine, supra note 32, at 384–85. 
 43. See SUP. CT. R. 37. 
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amicus brief supporting Illinois that included detailed discussion of how an 
adverse ruling would impact California.44  Similarly, in South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc.,45 the SAGs from New Hampshire and Montana each filed 
individual amicus briefs describing how a ruling permitting South Dakota to 
impose its sales tax on out-of-state retailers would adversely impact their 
states, which lacked sales taxes.46  In contrast, multistate briefs typically 
present collective interests that may be shared by the participating states.  
Some multistate amicus briefs support this assertion of shared interests by 
identifying relevant laws or practices from participating states.47  However, 
as shown in Table 1 below, at times discussion of individual state laws is 
incomplete or absent. 
In five high-profile Supreme Court cases from the 2017 term challenging 
state laws or practices, partisan coalitions of SAGs filed multistate amicus 
briefs on opposite sides.  The five cases are (1) Gill v. Whitford,48 in which 
Democratic voters in Wisconsin sued the state for its allegedly 
gerrymandered voting districts;49 (2) Husted v. A. Philip Randolph 
Institute,50 where voters and activists challenged Ohio’s practice of removing 
allegedly inactive voters from the state’s registration rolls;51 (3) Janus;52 
 
 44. Brief for the State of California Supporting Affirmance at 23–26, Janus v. Am. Fed’n 
of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466). 
 45. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
 46. Brief for Montana as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–2, Wayfair, 138 S. 
Ct. 2080 (No. 17-494); Brief for State of New Hampshire as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 1–2, Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (No. 17-494).  South Dakota was supported by 
a bipartisan multistate amicus brief filed on behalf of forty-one states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Brief for Colorado and Forty Other States, 
Two United States Territories, and the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (No. 17-494). 
 47. See, e.g., Brief for the States of New York, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and Washington, and 
the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents app., Janus, 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (No. 16-1466) [hereinafter Democratic Janus Brief]. 
 48. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 49. Id. at 1923.  For the SAG briefs in this case, see Brief for the States of Oregon, Alaska, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the District of 
Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161) 
[hereinafter Democratic Gill Brief]; and Brief for the States of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, 
Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161) [hereinafter Republican Gill Brief]. 
 50. 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018). 
 51. Id. at 1838–41.  For the SAG briefs in this case, see Brief of Georgia and Sixteen 
Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Husted, 138 S. Ct. 1833 (No. 16-980) 
[hereinafter Republican Husted Brief]; and Brief for the States of New York, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawai’i, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, 
and Washington, and the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Husted, 138 S. Ct. 1833 (No. 16-980) [hereinafter Democratic Husted Brief]. 
 52. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018); see supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.  For the SAG 
briefs in this case, see Republican Janus Brief, supra note 10; and Democratic Janus Brief, 
supra note 47. 
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(4) Masterpiece Cakeshop;53 and (5) National Institute of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA),54 which involved a First Amendment 
challenge to a California law that required certain health clinics to post and 
distribute notices regarding the availability of state-subsidized health 
services for pregnant women, including abortion.55  The table below shows 
the number of participating states in each multistate amicus brief, the SAG 
party affiliation, and the number of states with relevant state or local laws 
specifically identified or discussed in the amicus brief for each of these cases.  
In these cases, there was a complete partisan divide, with Democratic SAGs 
on one side and Republican SAGs on the other side, and one independent 
SAG joining with the Democrats in two cases. 
  
 
 53. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); see supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.  For the SAG 
briefs in this case, see Brief of Massachusetts, Hawaii, California, Connecticut, Delaware, the 
District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-
111) [hereinafter Democratic Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief]; Republican Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Brief, supra note 12. 
 54. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 55. Id. at 2368.  For the SAG briefs in this case, see Brief for the States of New York, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawai’i, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington, and the District of 
Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 
138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140) [hereinafter Democratic NIFLA Brief]; and Brief for the States 
of Texas, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by and Through 
Governor Matthew G. Bevin, and Paul R. Lepage, Governor of Maine, as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140) 
[hereinafter Republican NIFLA Brief]. 
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Table 1:  2017 Term Partisan Multistate SAG Amicus Briefs Filed on 
Opposite Sides in Supreme Court Challenges to State Law 
or Practice and Disclosure of Related State Laws 
 
Table 1 also shows the absence of complete disclosure of relevant laws 
within the participating SAGs’ states.  Only one brief—the Democratic SAG 
brief supporting Illinois in Janus—included laws from all participating 
SAGs’ states.  In contrast, the Republican SAG brief opposing Illinois in 
Janus did not disclose agency-fee laws that existed in some of the SAGs’ 
home states.  The Republican SAG brief opposing Colorado in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop cited one state law and one local law from twenty participating 
states, even though eighteen of the states have public accommodation laws. 
If a multistate amicus brief supports another state’s law, it might be 
inferred that the SAG is supporting federalism or state legislative authority 
generally.  That is, even if the state does not have a similar law, the SAG may 
determine it is in the state’s interest to protect the state’s ability to enact 
related legislation in the future. 
 
 56. In Table 1, the Attorney General for the District of Columbia is included as an SAG.  
Also, two Republican governors in states with Democratic SAGs joined Republican SAG 
amicus briefs. See infra notes 61, 63. 
 57. Democratic Gill Brief, supra note 49; Republican Gill Brief, supra note 49. 
 58. Republican Husted Brief, supra note 51; Democratic Husted Brief, supra note 51. 
 59. Republican Janus Brief, supra note 10; Democratic Janus Brief, supra note 47. 
 60. Democratic Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief, supra note 53; Republican Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Brief, supra note 12. 
 61. This number includes eighteen SAGs and two governors. 
 62. Democratic NIFLA Brief, supra note 55; Republican NIFLA Brief, supra note 55. 
 63. This number includes twenty SAGs and two governors. 
Case SAG56 Amicus Brief 
Supporting Challenged State 











Discussed Dem. Rep. Ind. Dem. Rep. Ind.
Gill57 0 16 0 0 17 0 1 12 
Husted58 0 17 0 0 13 0 0 11 
Janus59 20 0 1 21 0 20 0 1 
Masterpiece 
Cakeshop60 20 0 0 19 0 20
61 0 2 
NIFLA62 17 0 0 9 0 2263 0 21 
Note on Methodology:  These five cases were identified through a review of SAG 
amicus briefs listed on SCOTUSblog for all Supreme Court cases decided during 
the 2017 term.  Partisan affiliations for the SAGs signing each brief were 
determined by searching the websites maintained by DAGA and RAGA, see 
supra note 36, and Ballotpedia.org.  Citations to state laws were identified by 
reviewing the briefs, including the tables of authorities and any appendices. 
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However, an SAG who participates in a multistate amicus brief that 
opposes another state’s law, notwithstanding similar laws within the SAG’s 
own state, is essentially taking a nondefense position.  That is, by not 
disclosing or discussing the law, the SAG makes no effort to distinguish or 
otherwise protect it. 
Currently, SAGs joining multistate amicus briefs are not explicitly 
required to disclose relevant home-state laws or nondefense positions to the 
Court.  Although ethical rules require an attorney to disclose adverse, 
controlling law to the Court, a state statute or regulation technically might 
not be considered controlling, adverse authority when the state participates 
as an amicus—as opposed to as a party—and the challenged law is from a 
different state.64  Also, the nondefense procedures SAGs would follow if 
their state’s law had been directly challenged may not clearly apply.  Thus, 
other interested public officials or constituents from the SAGs’ states may 
not have an opportunity to respond to a hidden nondefense position in a 
multistate amicus brief before the Court. 
III.  HIDDEN NONDEFENSE:  CASE STUDIES 
The multistate amicus briefs opposing Illinois and Colorado in Janus and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, respectively, provide examples of SAGs taking 
positions that conflicted with laws in their own states without disclosing 
these state laws. 
A.  Janus v. American Federation of State, County, 
& Municipal Employees 
In Janus, the issue before the Court was whether the First Amendment 
prohibits a state from requiring public employees who decide not to join a 
union to pay an agency fee that would cover collective bargaining and related 
costs.65  The Court previously upheld agency fees in Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education.66  Mark Janus brought suit to challenge an Illinois agency-fee 
law and argued that Abood should be overruled.67  The Illinois SAG, a 
Democrat, defended the law.68  Nineteen Democratic SAGs, an independent 
SAG, and the AG from the District of Columbia jointly filed a multistate 
amicus brief in support of Illinois.69 
Illinois’s position was challenged in an amicus brief filed by Republican 
SAGs from twenty states, with Michigan identified as the lead state.70  In this 
amicus brief, the SAGs asserted that their states had “a vital interest in 
protecting the First Amendment rights of public employees, and in the fiscal 
 
 64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1)–(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 65. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). 
 66. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 67. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 68. See Brief for Respondents Lisa Madigan and Michael Hoffman, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (No. 16-1466). 
 69. Democratic Janus Brief, supra note 47, at 27, app. 
 70. Republican Janus Brief, supra note 10, at 1, 28. 
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health of state and local governments.”71  They argued that collective 
bargaining could have significant fiscal impacts that “implicate[d] matters of 
public concern.”72 
Beginning dramatically in the first paragraph, the amicus brief argued that 
collective bargaining contributed to municipal bankruptcy in Detroit, 
Michigan, and other jurisdictions:  “Detroit’s $3.5 billion in unfunded 
pension liabilities was a matter of great public concern not just for the city, 
but for all of Michigan.”73  The brief also highlighted Wisconsin, another 
amicus state, as a state where legislation “curbing public-sector collective 
bargaining” had provided fiscal benefits for state and local governments.74 
The Michigan and Wisconsin SAGs did not disclose in this amicus brief 
that Michigan and Wisconsin had their own agency-fee laws that, although 
limited to public safety and transit employees, were otherwise very similar 
to the Illinois law at issue.75  The Democratic SAG brief supporting Illinois 
criticized Michigan and Wisconsin’s position in the litigation, noting that 
“even the practices of petitioner’s own amici call into question petitioner’s 
proposed one-size-fits-all approach”: 
Indeed, legislatures in Michigan and Wisconsin—two of petitioner’s 
amici—also decided that, in some situations, public employers must have 
the ability to include agency-fee arrangements in their collective-
bargaining agreements.  This Court should view skeptically the efforts of 
these States and of petitioner himself to subvert the democratic decisions 
 
 71. Id. at 2. 
 72. Id. at 1, 7. 
 73. Id. at 1, 10–16.  The amicus brief also discussed municipal bankruptcies in Stockton 
and San Bernardino, California. Id. at 16–19.  California’s SAG supported Illinois in the 
litigation. See generally Brief for the State of California Supporting Affirmance, supra note 
44. 
 74. Republican Janus Brief, supra note 10, at 22–24. 
 75. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/6(e) (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 423.210(4)(a)–(b) (West 2018); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.70(1)(f), 111.70(2), 111.81(9), 
111.85(1)(c) (2019).  The Michigan and Wisconsin SAGs had both previously discussed their 
responsibilities to defend the laws of their states. Bill Schuette, Opinion, Why I Will Continue 
to Defend the Voting Law, DET. NEWS (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/ 
opinion/2016/09/07/schuette-will-continue-defend-voting-law/89987928/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2HJX-NCCC] (“[D]efending state law is the job of the AG.”); see also Brad Schimel, Attorney 
General’s Role Is to Uphold and Defend the Law of the Land, WIS. ST. J. (June 26, 2017), 
https://madison.com/wsj/opinion/column/brad-schimel-attorney-general-s-role-is-to-uphold-
and/article_727254ec-de2c-557b-bb21-f7a712cdc98e.html [https://perma.cc/VBV4-Y2TN] 
(“The role of the attorney general under Wisconsin’s Constitution is to defend the laws that 
the Legislature passes, so long as there is a good faith basis to make such arguments.”).  In 
addition, the Missouri SAG joined the brief even though enough Missouri residents had signed 
a petition to delay implementation of the 2017 “right to work” legislation until after a 
referendum vote. Judy Ancel, 310,567 Signatures Block ‘Right to Work’ in Missouri, LAB. 
NOTES (Sept. 18, 2017), http://www.labornotes.org/2017/09/310567-signatures-block-right-
work-missouri [https://perma.cc/BGA8-JZ9G].  In August 2018, Missouri voters defeated the 
legislation. See, e.g., John Haltiwanger, Missouri Voters Blocked the State’s ‘Right-To-Work’ 
Law in Perhaps the Biggest Electoral Stunner of the Night, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/missouri-right-to-work-law-vote-results-proposition-a-
2018-8 [https://perma.cc/BXV4-FAUQ]. 
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of voters by seeking to constitutionalize a contrary policy of their own 
preference.76 
The Democratic SAG brief supporting Illinois included an appendix listing 
state public-sector collective bargaining and agency-fee laws in all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia.77  The Republican SAG brief opposing Illinois 
did not include such a list. 
The Supreme Court held that Illinois’s law was unconstitutional, and it 
invalidated agency-fee laws and collective bargaining agreement provisions 
across the country.78  The impacted states included Michigan and 
Wisconsin.79  Thus, the Michigan and Wisconsin SAGs helped to undo laws 
and collective bargaining agreement provisions in their own states without 
disclosing the potential impact on their own state laws in their amicus brief. 
B.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, a for-profit bakery and its owner challenged the 
Colorado civil rights agency’s finding that they violated Colorado’s 
antidiscrimination law by refusing to provide a wedding cake to a same-sex 
couple.80  Colorado law prohibited discrimination in public accommodations 
based on sexual orientation.81  Colorado’s definition of “place of public 
accommodation” included “any place of business engaged in any sales to the 
public and any place offering services . . . to the public,” including retail 
businesses.82 
The bakery’s owner cited his religious objections to same-sex marriage 
and argued that, by requiring him to create cakes for same-sex wedding 
celebrations, Colorado had violated his First Amendment free speech and 
free exercise rights.83  Colorado’s SAG, a Republican, defended the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission in the case.84 
 
 76. Democratic Janus Brief, supra note 47, at 27, app.; see also Brief for Respondents 
Lisa Madigan and Michael Hoffman, supra note 68, at 53; Brief of the International 
Association of Fire Fighters as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7–8, Janus v. Am. 
Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466). 
 77. Democratic Janus Brief, supra note 47, app. 
 78. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. 
 79. See Amy Biolchini, Court Ruling Ends Right-to-Work Carve-Out for Michigan 
Police, Fire Unions, MLIVE (June 27, 2018), https://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/ 
2018/06/michigan_police_fire_unions_no.html [https://perma.cc/NAL5-Q3QT]; Mark 
Sommerhauser, Supreme Court:  Public-Safety Unions in Wisconsin Can’t Require Fees Be 
Paid by Non-Members, WIS. ST. J. (June 28, 2018), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-
and-politics/supreme-court-public-safety-unions-in-wisconsin-can-t-require/article_a0b8127 
a-486e-5041-ba2f-2376e48bbcd6.html [https://perma.cc/Y2CX-839X]. 
 80. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1726 
(2018). 
 81. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018). 
 82. Id. § 24-34-601(1).  The statute included an exception for places “principally used for 
religious purposes.” Id. 
 83. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. 
 84. Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 
S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
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Two competing multistate SAG amicus briefs were filed in this litigation, 
with a clear partisan divide.  Democratic SAGs from Massachusetts, eighteen 
other states, and the District of Columbia filed a brief on behalf of 
Colorado.85  Republican SAGs from Texas, seventeen other states, and the 
governors of Kentucky and Maine filed a brief opposing Colorado.86 
In describing the “Interest of Amici Curiae,” the Republican SAG amicus 
brief opposing Colorado’s law asserted that “[s]tates do not have a legitimate 
interest in compelling citizens to engage in state-favored expression.”87  One 
argument advanced in the brief was as follows:  “[P]ublic-accommodation 
concerns of past eras are not present here; customized pieces of art are not 
public accommodations (like restaurants and hotels), the artist plainly did not 
act out of invidious discrimination, and complainants had immediate access 
to other artists . . . .”88  Moreover, the brief suggested that one solution for 
states to avoid violating an artist’s constitutional rights would be to “define 
‘public accommodations’ in the manner done so by the federal government, 
so as not to capture businesses that—by their nature—selectively choose 
clients.”89  The brief cited federal law, as well as a Wisconsin decision that 
held that “Wisconsin’s analogous anti-discrimination law does not apply in 
similar circumstance to this case.”90 
Most state public-accommodation laws, similar to Colorado’s statute, 
define public accommodation more broadly than federal law.91  Of the 
eighteen SAGs who signed on to the Texas amicus brief opposing Colorado, 
sixteen—all but the SAGs from Texas and Alabama—were from states that 
 
 85. See generally Democratic Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief, supra note 53.  The states 
joining this brief included Massachusetts, Hawaii, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, 
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Id.  For information 
regarding the SAGs’ membership in the Democratic party, see DEMOCRATIC ATTORNEYS GEN. 
ASS’N, supra note 36; and see also BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Main_Page 
[https://perma.cc/RJN8-JSZX] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 86. See generally Republican Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief, supra note 12.  The states 
joining this brief included Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.  For information regarding the SAGs’ 
membership in the Republican party, see REPUBLICAN ATTORNEYS GEN. ASS’N, supra note 36; 
and see also BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 85. 
 87. Republican Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief, supra note 12, at 1. 
 88. Id. at 3; see also id. at 20. 
 89. Id. at 26 n.10. 
 90. Id. (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012); then citing Amy Lynn Photography Studio, 
LLC v. City of Madison, No. 2017CV0555 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2017)).  Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin 
in private lodgings, food service establishments, gasoline stations, theaters, and other places 
of entertainment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. 
 91. Jeremy D. Bayless & Sophie F. Wang, Racism on Aisle Two:  A Survey of Federal 
and State Anti-Discrimination Public Accommodation Laws, 2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 288, 
300 (2011); Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State Public Accommodations Laws, 60 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 638–52 (2016). 
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had their own public-accommodation laws.92  These laws, as well as the laws 
from the two states whose governors joined the amicus brief, prohibit 
discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, religion, and other 
categories that vary from state to state.93 
In those eighteen states, the definitions of public accommodation are 
similar to Colorado’s and extend far beyond “restaurants and hotels.”  All 
eighteen states prohibit discrimination by entities that provide goods or 
services to the public, with limited exceptions that would not apply to a for-
profit business open to the public like the bakery in Masterpiece Cakeshop.94  
Several of the states specifically prohibit discrimination in “stores,”95 “sales 
or rental establishments,”96 or “retail or wholesale establishments.”97  Maine 
and Nevada expressly prohibit discrimination in bakeries.98 
Even so, with the exception of Wisconsin’s law, the SAGs opposing 
Colorado did not cite or mention any of their states’ public-accommodation 
laws in the brief.99  There was no discussion of the text of the public-
accommodation laws in the states signing the brief or how these laws have 
been interpreted by state civil rights enforcement agencies or the courts.  For 
states other than Wisconsin, there was no discussion of whether or how the 
 
 92. See State Public Accommodation Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 13, 
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-
laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8VWH-U2RF]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441(2) (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7) 
(2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5902(9) (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.130 (West 2018); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:2232(9) (2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (2018); MO. ANN. 
STAT. §§ 213.010(16), 213.065(3) (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101(20), 49-2-
304, 49-2-402 (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-133, 20-137, 20-138 (West 2018); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050(3)(f) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(14) (2018); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401 (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-9-10(B)–(C), 45-9-20 (2018); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1(12) (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(15) (2018); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-2(3)(a)(i), 13-7-3 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(j) (2019); WIS. STAT. 
§ 106.52(1)(e) (2019). 
 95. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.130; LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 51:2232(9); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401; TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(15). 
 96. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8)(E) (“sales or rental establishment”); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 651.050(3)(f) (same). 
 97. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-9-10(B)–(C) (“retail or wholesale establishment”). 
 98. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8)(E); NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050(3)(f). 
 99. See generally Republican Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief, supra note 12.  Furthermore, 
the Wisconsin case involved a photography studio operated out of its owner’s apartment.  The 
owner indicated that she provided “commissioned visual storytelling services” on a “case-by-
case” basis, and she would then post and write about some photographs in her blog or on social 
media. Verified Complaint at 1, 6–7, Amy Lynn Photography Studio, LLC v. City of Madison, 
No. 2017CV0555 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 5, 2017).  The Court found that the Wisconsin public-
accommodation law did not apply in part because there was no “place” of public 
accommodation, in that “this studio does not operate a physical storefront open to the public.” 
Proposed Order Granting Declaratory Judgment at 3–4, Amy Lynn Photography Studio, LLC 
v. City of Madison, No. 2017CV0555 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2017).  In addition, the court 
found the studio was not “comparable to or consistent with” other types of businesses 
recognized as places of public accommodation under Wisconsin law. Id. at 4 (quoting 
Hatheway v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1990)). 
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position advanced in the brief could or should be reconciled with the states’ 
own public-accommodation laws or how a ruling on the grounds advocated 
in the brief might impact enforcement of their laws. 
Furthermore, while the SAGs opposing Colorado faulted Colorado’s 
application of its law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
they did not mention laws prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination 
within their own states.  These SAGs accepted Masterpiece Cakeshop’s 
argument that the bakery’s owner did not discriminate based on sexual 
orientation because although he would not “creat[e] commissioned 
expression for same-sex weddings,” he would sell other goods to customers 
“regardless of [their] sexual orientation.”100  However, the Republican SAG 
amicus brief did not discuss the interpretation—or even the existence—of 
similar laws in several of the SAGs’ states or in municipalities within their 
states.  Nevada, Wisconsin and Maine all had state laws prohibiting 
discrimination in public accommodations based on sexual orientation.101  
Other than the reference to Wisconsin law, there was no discussion of how 
these laws have been interpreted or might apply in similar situations. 
Also, at least eleven of the participating SAGs’ states—including Texas—
had municipalities with laws prohibiting sexual-orientation 
discrimination.102  However, the only local law discussed in the brief was a 
law in Phoenix, Arizona; the SAGs faulted the “peculiar way” in which 
Phoenix and other jurisdictions had applied their sexual-orientation 
antidiscrimination public-accommodation laws.103  In Phoenix, a wedding-
invitation designer who did not wish to create invitations for same-sex 
weddings unsuccessfully challenged enforcement of Phoenix’s 
antidiscrimination law.104  Arizona’s SAG, who joined the Republican SAG 
amicus brief, did not participate in the Phoenix litigation although it was 
within his own state.105  There was no discussion in the brief of why it was 
in Arizona’s interest to oppose Phoenix’s interpretation of its law, which was 
upheld by Arizona courts.106 
The Court resolved the Masterpiece Cakeshop litigation by finding that 
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had demonstrated a lack of religious 
neutrality in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.107  Although the Court 
 
 100. Republican Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief, supra note 12, at 26. 
 101. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4591–4592 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.070 (2017); WIS. 
STAT. § 106.52(3)(a)(1)–(3) (2019). 
 102. In addition to Texas (where local laws prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination 
in public accommodations existed in San Antonio, Dallas, Austin, Fort Worth, El Paso, and 
Plano), the states included Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia.  The local laws are listed in 
an appendix to the multistate amicus brief filed in support of Colorado. Democratic 
Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief, supra note 53, app. B. 
 103. Republican Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief, supra note 12, at 27–28. 
 104. See Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 431–32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2018), review granted (Nov. 20, 2018). 
 105. See id. at 430 (listing attorneys). 
 106. See generally Republican Masterpiece Cakeshop Brief, supra note 12. 
 107. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 
(2018). 
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did not reach the question of whether Colorado could enforce its public-
accommodation law against a bakery when the bakery owner asserted 
religious objections to preparing wedding cakes for same-sex couples,108 this 
issue may be revisited in the future.  Republican SAGs from Texas, Arizona, 
and other states recently filed a multistate Supreme Court amicus brief 
supporting a petition for certiorari filed by an Oregon bakery that would not 
create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.109  In this brief, the Republican 
SAGs repeated the arguments about public accommodations that they made 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop—again without discussing their own states’ 
laws.110 
IV.  ADDRESSING HIDDEN NONDEFENSE BY REQUIRING TRANSPARENCY 
An SAG’s contributions to an amicus brief in Supreme Court litigation can 
help to invalidate the state’s own laws, as demonstrated in the Janus case.111  
An SAG’s position in an amicus brief could also induce the Court to narrow 
the scope of laws within the SAG’s state or limit the authority of state or local 
enforcement agencies, which might have happened had the Court adopted the 
Republican SAG arguments against Colorado in Masterpiece Cakeshop.  
These outcomes can result without the SAGs disclosing to the Court or to the 
public the impact that their position may have on laws in their respective 
states.  Without disclosure, SAGs lack accountability to the Court and to the 
public for a nondefense decision.  Without accountability, SAGs may act in 
the interest of political and personal preferences rather than on behalf of their 
state. 
One way to remedy this failure of accountability is to require that, like the 
parties to the litigation, SAGs filing amicus briefs identify any state or local 
laws relevant to the litigation and explain how their position would affect 
their states’ laws.112  If the SAG believes that no laws would be impacted, 
the SAG could certify that no state laws, or local laws within the state, would 
be adversely impacted by an outcome in the litigation.  If a state or local law 
could be impacted, the SAG could explain the potential impact, including 
whether the state or local law is distinguishable from any law being 
challenged before the Court. 
These changes could be implemented through an amendment to the 
Supreme Court’s rules.113  Additionally, they could be implemented through 
the policies and practices of individual SAGs and organizations that provide 
support for SAG Supreme Court amicus briefs.  SAGs could include this 
 
 108. Id. at 1731. 
 109. See generally Brief for the States of Texas, Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Louisiana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., No. 18-547 (U.S. petition for 
cert. filed Oct. 19, 2018). 
 110. See id. at 4, 15, 19 n.8. 
 111. See supra Part III.A. 
 112. SUP. CT. R. 24(1)(f) (requiring “merits” briefs to include the legal provisions 
“involved in the case, set out verbatim with appropriate citation”). 
 113. Id. r. 37. 
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information in a statement of interest, in the discussion section of the brief, 
or in an appendix.114  For example, in Janus and in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
the multistate briefs supporting Illinois and Colorado included appendices 
listing agency-fee laws and sexual-orientation discrimination laws from 
across the country, including relevant laws from the participating SAGs’ 
states.115 
In discussing how a state or local law might be impacted by a ruling made 
by the Court, it may be appropriate in some cases for SAGs to explain how 
the text or implementation of their laws are different from the law or practice 
before the Court.  For example, in District of Columbia v. Heller,116 a 
bipartisan group of thirty-one SAGs who opposed the District of Columbia’s 
handgun ban emphasized the breadth of the D.C. law, which they argued was 
“markedly out of step with the judgment of the legislatures of the fifty 
States.”117  They distinguished laws in their own states and argued that states 
“have a strong interest in maintaining the many state laws prohibiting felons 
in possession, restricting machine guns and sawed-off shotguns, and the 
like.”118  The amicus brief appendix included a table listing laws in these 
categories in all fifty states, with blank spaces for states that did not have 
laws in a given category.119  The Supreme Court decision recognized an 
individual’s right to bear arms and struck down D.C.’s law, but it also 
recognized limitations on that right that were consistent with the amicus brief 
arguments.120 
If a law or practice in the SAG’s home state could be adversely impacted 
if the SAG’s position in the brief is adopted, the SAG should act in the same 
way as if a related law in their own state had been challenged and follow 
whatever procedures the SAG would follow if the SAG declined to defend 
the law in litigation within the state.  Thus, the SAG could still file an amicus 
brief that could contribute to invalidation of the state’s own law while 
disclosing the state’s law and explaining the reasons for this position.  In this 
way, the Court would be fully informed about the SAG’s position in the brief 
and the potential impact of the Court’s ruling on the SAG’s state.  The SAG 
could also provide notice to others within the state who might seek leave to 
file an amicus brief in the case.  Through disclosure and public notification, 
SAGs would be more accountable to constituents who may have an interest 
in the law that the SAG has in effect opposed before the Court and who might 
 
 114. Cf. id. r. 24(1)(f) (noting that for “merits” briefs, lengthy statutory text may be 
provided in “an appendix to the brief”). 
 115. Democratic Janus Brief, supra note 47, app.; Democratic Masterpiece Cakeshop 
Brief, supra note 53, app. 
 116. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 117. Brief of the States of Texas, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290). 
 118. Id. at 36. 
 119. Id. app. at 7a–16a. 
 120. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–28. 
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otherwise have no opportunity to express their concerns until the next 
election.121 
When an SAG participates as an amicus curiae in Supreme Court 
litigation, neither the parties, the other amici participants, nor the Court 
should be required to review the SAG’s state laws to determine whether any 
law in the SAG’s own state may be at risk.  The SAG’s authority to file an 
amicus brief comes from the SAG’s role as chief legal officer of her state.122  
An SAG’s failure to disclose relevant information about laws within the state 
may raise questions about whether the amicus brief is in fact being submitted 
on behalf of a state.  Furthermore, SAGs are experts on the laws within their 
states.  They are in a better position to research complex state or local 
statutory or regulatory schemes, explain state laws, and provide needed 
context.  For example, the Democratic SAG brief in Husted, which included 
SAGs from Hawaii, Illinois, and Oregon, identified errors in how Ohio’s 
brief characterized voter-registration laws and practices from those three 
states.123 
Requiring disclosure of laws that could be impacted by the litigation is not 
a perfect solution because there may be some disagreement over which laws 
could be impacted.  For example, in NIFLA, the Democratic and Republican 
SAG amicus briefs disagreed over whether California’s law, which required 
medical clinics to post and distribute notices of state programs that provide 
family planning services and abortion, could be distinguished from laws in 
the SAGs’ states.124  Moreover, the briefs identified laws from some of the 
same states, but in many cases the laws they considered relevant were 
different.125  The Democratic SAGs argued that laws requiring disclosure of 
health and safety information were at risk, while the Republican SAGs 
distinguished laws requiring “informed consent” for abortion.126 
Finally, requiring SAGs to discuss their own laws in multistate amicus 
briefs could ensure a well-considered position by each participating SAG.  
For example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the primary author on the brief was 
the SAG from Texas,127 a state that does not have a public-accommodation 
 
 121. In November 2018, the Michigan SAG who led the Janus amicus brief and the 
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e6035a.html [https://perma.cc/T2K8-TUW8]. 
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 124. See generally Democratic NIFLA Brief, supra note 55; Republican NIFLA Brief, 
supra note 55. 
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Brief, supra note 55, at 1–2. 
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law.  It is unclear to what extent the other SAGs who joined the brief 
considered possible risks to the public-accommodation laws in their own 
states should the Court adopt the narrow construction proposed in the amicus 
brief.  Requiring SAGs to identify and describe their laws could potentially 
lead to SAGs seeking changes in the arguments presented in a multistate 
brief, or declining to sign the brief at all.  As Professor Shaw has argued, “[I]f 
state actors are required to publicly articulate their objections in 
constitutional terms, the chances that they will refuse to defend laws they 
find merely politically troubling, rather than genuinely constitutionally 
objectionable, are at least reduced.”128 
CONCLUSION 
When SAGs engage in hidden nondefense, they transform their role in our 
legal system.  Rather than upholding legal and ethical principles as the states’ 
chief legal officers, they can become partisan operatives and potentially 
undermine democratic institutions within their own states. 
Requiring SAGs to identify in Supreme Court amicus briefs any laws from 
their own state that may be impacted by the case outcome is a simple step 
that provides many benefits.  It could help clarify the issues before the Court 
and frame and inform the scope of the Court’s ruling.  Moreover, it ensures 
that nondefense decisions are not hidden.  In this way, this change would 
promote accountability to SAGs’ constituents and to the Court, and it would 
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